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Introduction
After presenting a review of the legal literature recently (Walsh, in press), I was
asked why circumspect critiques of forensic biology were not as common in the
forensic literature as they were in the literature of other disciplines.' Several practical
reasons sprang to mind related to the young age of our discipline and the burdens
of casework delivery. Notwithstanding these possible reasons, the current status
of the field couldbe seen as an ideal juncture to review our forensic contribution,
learn the lessons of the past, and tum a strategic eye to future developments and
pre-empt their likely impact (Walsh, Ribaux, Buckleton, & Roux, 2004).
Undoubtedly, the role of the forensic biologist in the criminal justice system has
changed, as, of course, it will continue to in the future. This change is predominantly
due to the impact of several developments that have expanded the use of the
technology, amended the casework and evidence submission profiles, and increased
the demands on practitioners and laboratories. These include the following:
• A considerable increase in the volume of testing required and a change in the
submission profile of the cases and the associated evidence
• A considerable increase in the use of DNA databases
• A groundswell to move DNA typing (along with other forms of forensic evidence)
forward in the chain of events so that it functions more effectively as part of the
investigative domain
• Strong feelings (in contrast to the previous point) that forensic applications
should be completely isolated from neighbouring domains of the criminal justice
system
• A diversifying technological platform that is extending into areas beyond
iden tifica tion
Although these developments have emerged as logical extensions of the use
of forensic DNA profiling, their implementation has not always been closely
scrutinised, In some way, each development is linked to the manner in which forensic
DNA evidence is utilised and presented in court. As a result, some have emerged as
concerns in court cases in Australia and overseas. The following discussion offers a
concise inventory of issues currently facing forensic biology, It is written to encourage
the forensic community to realise the significance of some of these factors and take
ownership for their man; nent and control. This encouragement is premised on
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the fact that we are best positioned to accept these challenges and respond to them
in such a way that will advance our field and thereby benefit the justice system.
Changing Volume and Submission Profile of Casework
While the contribution of forensic DNA evidence has increased in the past 5 to 10
years, the increased volume of casework and the alteration in the nature of core
evidence types are associated with a series of accompanying pressures. In summary,
staff must cope with greater personal expectations in terms of their casework
output, in the context of more complex technical and interpretative challenges
that are commonly associated with discrete evidence types (e.g., low copy number
templates). Frequently, laboratories have been unable to cope with the rising volume
of casework. Many jurisdictional centres in Australia and overseas have accrued
casework backlogs that have in turn brought delays in the presentation of DNA
evidence in court. In some circumstances, trials have had to proceed without any
DNA evidence at all.
From a scientist's perspective, this operational environment can cause considerable
stress and pressure. This, in turn, can heighten the potential for error; compromise
the ability to adequately prepare personally for court testimony; leave insufficient
time for research, training, and professional development; or diminish the emphasis
on best-practice models that may be seen as incurring unmanageable commitments
of staff time. Another potential consequence of an excess workload is that it could
encourage a generation of scientists or a professional culture that is conditioned to
focus specifically on output at the expense of genuine expertise. An environment
that is streamlined to respond only to core-business demands and necessitates
energy and aptitude more than deliberate, expert reasoning is perhaps ill-suited to
the intrinsic scrutiny that is a precept of the justice system.
Of course, this reality is undesirable, but it is also a reality that has evolved through
the continued success of this forensic discipline and the personal contributions of
those administering or practising within it. As a result, one must be careful not to
complain incessantly about it but rather to encourage the necessary changes to the
process. These needs can differ for different jurisdictions but may be resource-based
or problems of culture or competence.
The Increasing Use of DNA Databases
The increase in case volume has been catalysed largely by the introduction of DNA
databases. In addition, there has also been an alteration to the types of crimes and
evidence submitted for biological analysis. In particular, some of the trends include
the following:
• Increased submission of evidence from "high-volume" crimes such as burglary,
vehicle theft, robbery, and drug offences (Harbison, Hamilton, & Walsh, 2001)
• Increased submissions of discrete evidence types such as swabs from touched
surfaces (referred to hereinafter as "trace DNA") (Raymond, Walsh, van Oorschot,
Cunn, & Roux, 2004), swabs from drinking containers (Abaz et al., 2002), or food
remnants and cigarette butts (Walsh & Moss,2oo1)
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• Increased submission of evidence types such as those listed above, which may
have a lower probative value than traditional forms of biological evidence such
as blood and semen
• Increased submission of cases and evidence in circumstances in which there is
a lack of any other supporting evidence (i.e., when DNA evidence stands alone
as a supportive aspect of a particular proposition)
In response to both the growing volume and the changing nature of submissions,
laboratories have faced an increasing need to streamline their practices in an attempt
to gain efficiency where possible. A practical consequence of this is a reduced
likelihood that a reporting scientist will have actually had a role in the technical
analysis of the samples themselves. This is not unusual in many forms of laboratory
analysis, and the practice is commonplace in forensic laboratories from around the
world; however, gains in the efficiency of the laboratory process are not the only
concern when it comes to forensic work.
The courts require expert evidence to satisfy an array of criteria based upon the
Evidence Acts and their case law derivatives. In two recent Australian cases, evidence
generated from a streamlined analytical or reporting process was deemed unsuitable
for use in criminal proceedings. In R v. Sing (2002), the New South Wales Court of
Criminal Appeal considered this trend of analysis and reporting from the perspective
of the "hearsay" rule. In Sing, the question as to whether under such circumstances
the evidence of a witness involves hearsay or is based on hearsay was not ultimately
resolved. Of more importance was the failure of the Crown to fulfill its obligation
to "present all available witnesses of events alleged to constitute the offence and
of essential parts of the prosecution case, unless there is some justification for not
doing so" (Hodgson JA at paragraph 35, to which Levine and Howie ITagreed). This
was held to be of particular relevance in this case due to the compelling nature of
the DNA as identification evidence. In explaining the court's reasons, Hodgson JA
stated (to which Levine and Howie ITagreed),
If this court were free to speculate about the matter, one might speculate that
there is only a very small probability that there was error in the carrying out
of the tests, or that a significant possibility of error could be demonstrated to
a jury either by cross-examination or evidence. However, for reasons I have
given, I think this was a serious gap in the prosecution case, and I do not think
this court should speculate about the matter. I do not think this court can be
certain that the appellant has not lost a realistic chance of either having the DNA
material excluded, or at least significantly weakened. (at paragraph 38)
Similar issues were highlighted in R v. Ryan (2002) in which the Supreme Court of
Victoria Court of Appeal found that the Crown had failed to establish the facts or
continuity of evidence upon which the forensic DNA expert opinion was based.
In so ruling and ordering that a verdict of acquittal be entered, Ormiston, Vincent,
and Eames ITAstate, "In the present matter, the prosecution simply failed to adduce
any admissible evidence whatever in relation to what was in effect the single
issue before the jury" (at paragraph 12).2Unfortunately, the appeal in Ryan came
2 years after the defendant had first been incarcerated and as suchcould legally be
viewed as an inappropriate conviction involving the presentation of DNA evidence.
Although the evidenc .'self was not at issue, the manner in which it is obtained
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and reported is at the heart of both Ryan and Sing. These rulings should alert the
forensic and prosecutorial sectors. From a forensic perspective, there is the challenge
to ensure that we understand the needs of the courts as well as our scientific domain.
Streamlined laboratory practices may be resource- and time-efficient; however, if
they lead to evidence of unsuitable quality, then they are of little ultimate value to
the justice system.
The changing nature of the submitted DNA evidence from traditional sources,
such as blood and semen, to more discrete evidence types, such as trace DNA and
discarded items (e.g., drinking containers, cigarette butts, etc.), has an associated
effect on the probative value of such evidence. This can indirectly place the scientist
in a more difficult position. This is particularly true in the interpretative areas in
which the questions focus on the link between any recovered DNA evidence and
the actions or activities alleged to have taken place in a criminal event. These
are, of course, the areas that are the primary concern of the courts, as they often
contribute to resolving pivotal issues such as culpability or intent. In evaluating
these sorts of evidential ambiguities, a forensic witness would routinely turn to a
body of experimental data (e.g., the population data and statistical research that
underpins likelihood ratio calculations) and interpret the current findings in the
context of this empirical information. There are two challenges of working with
discrete evidence sources: (1) ambiguities relating the source of the deposit, the
duration it has been in the location it was recovered from, and the mechanism by
which it was deposited remain unanswerable and (2)where experimental data exists,
it is as yet inconclusive and may never adequately address the myriad of potential
propositions that could be advanced to explain the origins of a sample of trace DNA
evidence. When these limitations (and this is all that they can be seen to be) of the
DNA evidence are brought before a court, they are often met with concern and/ or
alarm by members of the judiciary or the jury. This may be related to the perceived
"aura of certainty" that has been said to precede DNA evidence when it is placed
in the legal or public domain (Corns, 1992).
A recent example of an adverse reaction to this issue occurred in the Supreme Court
of the Northern Territory (Criminal) where trace DNA evidence was excluded in
R v. Joyce (2002)on the basis that the probability of innocent secondary transfer could
not be adequately assessed. In Joyce, the complainant (a 14 year-old boy) had slept
at the home of the accused, in clothes that were later included as evidence. DNA
profiles located on the clothes matched the DNA of the accused; however, this was
deemed to be inconsequential as the clothing was known to have contacted "furniture,
floors or carpets at the accused place of residence" (at paragraph 3). This potentially
innocent explanation for the presence of the DNA results was obviously contrary to
the prosecution hypothesis. The fact that the Crown had not adequately countered
this alternate hypothesis, "nor laid any scientific basis for preferring one hypothesis
over another" (at paragraph 5) led Angell to conclude (at paragraph 8), fl ••• there is
no reliable foundation upon which a jury could properly assess the explanation for
the presence of the accused's DNA on the complainant's clothing ... The evidence
is thus of no probative value and therefore inadmissible as proof of guilt."
The ruling in Joyce highlights difficulties alluded to earlier and may also indicate that
forensic DNA research is guilty of focusing too heavily on technological aspects of
the process, to the neglect of helpful criminalistic features associated with transfer,
persistence, and abundance.
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The increasing use of DNA intelligence databases also has the effect of incorporating
DNA evidence in cases in which there is a lack of other supporting evidence. This is
particularly true for "historic" cases, which are submitted for DNA analysis as "cold
cases" in the hope of re-invigorating unsolved investigations ("Using DNA," 2002).
In many circumstances (e.g., numerous post-conviction DNA cases examined in the
United States), the probative value of the DNA link may be unequivocal. In some
circumstances, however, the probative link will be of a more tenuous nature. This
may be a source of pressure for a forensic scientist. It is important, given the often
high-profile nature of this kind of testing, to reinforce once more that DNA remains
an item of physical evidence only and is not in itself proof of guilt or innocence.
In this regard, it is scientists who must ensure that the wrong impression of the
potential strength of the evidence is not propagated by those wishing to inflate or
denigrate its potential. A failure to engender this understanding will only increase
pressure on witnesses and foster unreasonable expectations on the part of police,
prosecutors, and the public.
Another future aspect of DNA evidence, which is related both to the use of DNA
databases and a common misunderstanding on behalf of members of the public, is
the likely event of adventitious matches.' As the size of DNA databases increase, the
likelihood of an adventitious match between unrelated individuals also increases
(Walsh & Buckleton, 2004). In fact, adventitious matches (at 6 STR loci) have already
been identified in countries with very large databases, such as the UK (Samuel,
2001) and in countries where the existence of duplicate profiles are examined and
investigated, such as New Zealand (Walsh et al., 2002). Forensic scientists need to
firstly understand in detail the meaning of the match statistics that they calculate
and report so as not to mislead the courts or public unduly with regard to the
strength of the evidence. Secondly, the propensity for adventitious DNA matches
to occur with DNA databases at some time in the future must be understood, and
appropriate strategies should be devised to inform people during what will without
doubt be a time of some confusion and misplaced concern about the integrity of
the DNA database system.
A final point that forensic scientists must consider in relation to the use of forensic
DNA databases is the increased need for awareness of relevant sociolegal issues.
In a practical context, DNA-based legislation represents an additional level of
governance for forensic professionals, and one of the first pieces of law that places
direct requirements on the manner in which they undertake their professional work.
In addition, it prescribes sanctions for individuals or institutions who contravene
the administrative processes detailed in these laws. Fervent debate has continued on
many of the issues associated with the use of forensic DNA profiling in the criminal
justice system, and this debate has now expanded to encompass applications of the
scientific process that are primarily the responsibility of the forensic community.
Unfortunately, the forensic community has remained largely mute in this discussion.
As such, it has been dominated by a generalist tone that is abstract from the
practical context. Notwithstanding this, forensic professionals (and particularly
the administrators of forensic institutions) would do well to acquaint themselves
with these issues and enter the existing debate. Failure to do so could mean that the
direction for the application of our scientific tools will become the responsibility of
individuals who are well-removed from the forensic community itself.
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Increasing the Use of Forensic DNA Evidence as an
Intelligence Tool
Forensic DNA databases have catalyzed a re-think of the role of forensic evidence
in the investigative process. Traditionally, forensic DNA evidence has been thought
of as information for the use of the court. This has meant that it is usually applied
retrospectively, after the police investigation has concluded and a suspect(s) has
been identified by other means. The DNA evidence is then used to corroborate
(or not) the version of events proposed on the basis of the police investigation.
Because of the potential for DNA databases to link cases to individuals, or other
cases, on the basis of a common DNA profile, they have been used increasingly as
an investigative tool by police as a means to direct the investigation, rather than
simply reaffirm its findings.
This is an exciting advance for forensic science and one that allows new potential
for using DNA evidence and forensic DNA databases proactively rather than
reactively (Walsh, Moss, Kleim, & Vintiner, 2002). More advanced models of what
has been termed "forensic intelligence" have successfully integrated DNA evidence
fully as part of the investigative and crime analysis response of police, facilitating
their ability to detect crime trends and respond in a manner that has an increased
likelihood of apprehension (Ribaux & Margot, 1999,2003; Ribaux et al., 2003). An
interesting by-product of this approach, however, is that it relies upon a more intimate
relationship between forensic and law enforcement domains. This, in turn, not only
alters the stage at which DNA evidence is introduced into an investigation but also
the use to which it is put by the police. Critical aspects of useable intelligence, such
as timeliness, are not readily achievable by a system that is focused on delivering
an extremely high level of precision and discrimination. In addition, should this
aspect of the evidence be altered in the interests of integrating DNA results into an
intelligence-based framework, any resultant effect on the use to which the DNA
evidence can be applied must be clearly communicated to police (i.e., it must be clear
if results are provided for intelligence uses only as opposed to evidence uses).
The use of DNA evidence in this way represents a potential for a greater contribution
to the resolution of crimes and possibly to crime reduction and prevention strategies.
As with other topics discussed earlier, however, it is contingent upon a thorough
level of understanding by all participants of the justice system and a thoughtful
model of application. At present, the area of forensic intelligence is emerging and
remains only partially understood by many in the forensic and law enforcement
fields. It is vital that forensic scientists also understand and accept the implications
of adopting such a model of operation. That is, they should be comfortable with
an operational context that is more purposefully linked to the law enforcement
domain, and they should undertake this role as an additional application of DNA
evidence and not as a substitute for the highly discriminating level of evidence that
is demanded by the criminal courts. This dichotomous application of forensic DNA
evidence (should it come to pass) must be purposefully implemented with the full
commitment of law enforcement and forensic agencies.
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The Call for FUlly Isolated and Independent Forensic Laboratory
Services
In contrast to the previous point, there has been a continued call for greater
segregation of forensic services from police and prosecutorial agencies (Roberts,
1996;Thompson, 1997).This view is premised on the implication, partially supported
by some unfortunate examples of misconduct (Starrs, 1988;Giannelli, 1993), that the
pressures on a scientist working in a police- or prosecutor-controlled laboratory will
compromise their objectivity, either consciously or unconsciously (Saks, Rissinger,
Rosenthal, & Thompson, 2003). Thompson (1997) specifically warned of the danger
of forensic scientists "adopting the goals of their clients (the law enforcement team)
as their own" (p. 1115).Research has supported the assertion that the most significant
pressures brought to bear on a forensic expert come from being a witness in the
adversarial process (Lucas, 1989; Saks, 1989).
Two points arise from the topic of these discussions:
1. It is misleading to propagate a perception that forensic DNA evidence is inherently
unreliable or that forensic experts are inherently incompetent or untrustworthy.
This is not the intentions of the previously mentioned articles; however, there is
an occasional tendency to perceive them as such. I believe that regardless of the
isolated individuals or circumstances that may have contributed to miscarriages
of justice-and whether those individuals were practitioners in the legal or
scientific domains-we must accept that the issue is a system-wide issue and that
the responsibilities for appropriate use of evidence are often inextricably shared.
As such, failures of integrity, impartiality, or accuracy must be addressed by the
individual domains if necessary, but as part of a system that has some level of
overall culpability.
2. It is somewhat redundant to continually cite the context within which our
expertise is applied as a source of insurmountable ethical dilemmas. As forensic
scientists, we should determine and then advocate the most appropriate means to
utilise our scientific expertise. This may well encompass a greater incorporation
of intelligence-based approaches, and as such, a greater engagement with the
investigative phase of the criminal justice process. If it does, however, this need
not occur at the expense of our objectivity or impartiality. Forensic scientists
must accept their need to operate (to varying degrees) as a component of the
investigatory team and draw the appropriate professional conclusions in order to
undertake such a role without compromising the high standards of professional
integrity demanded by our justice system and our communities. As with many
of the aforementioned points, this is a commitment to an appropriate attitude.
One that realises the importance of the role of a forensic scientist, values it, and
seeks to contribute purposefully to the resolution to complex problems of criminal
justice.
Diversification of the Technological Platform
Technology has played a key part in the expanded use of forensic DNA profiling;
however, it has primarily been directed at the issue of identification of source.
Most technological effort has focused on enhancing the sensitivity of PCR-based
systems, increasing thei scriminating power (through the addition of more
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el~ctro:phoretic device~) '.Another significant aspect of DNA technology is that it has
pnm~nly targ~ted van~tlOn on the noncoding regions of the genome as they provide
more informative solutions to the question of identity. Noncoding loci have an added
nontechnical advantage in that they do not prescribe physical or personal features
of ~e donor (with the exception of a marker that is routinely typed to infer gender).
This feature h~s been a reassurance to those who are concerned about widespread
use of DNA evidence through databases or mass-screens, as it invalidates the notion
that forensic DNA testing is linked in any way to the search for the criminal gene
or part of some modem form of eugenics (Webb & Tranter, 2001).
This, how.e:ver,.may be. about to change. The technological platform upon which
DNA profiling is based is not only set to continue its drive toward greater expansion,
?utOl~?tio~, and miniaturisation, but it is also set to diversify into areas beyond the
identification of source (Walsh, Roux, Ross, Ribaux, & Buckleton, 2002). Research is
progressing in the identification of markers that can infer phenotypic characteristics
of the sample donor (e.g., hair colour and ethnicity) (Grimes, Noakes, Dixon,
& Urquhart, 2001; Frudakis et al., 2003). The range of available markers could
exp.an~ in m.any directions a~d provide different forms of useful intelligence for
police investigators. Once agam, these kinds of developments are best suited to an
~nvest!gative ra~her than evidential use. That is because they will always be limited
in t~~ir conc~us1Veness and a~ such should be utilised to simply aid investigative
decis~onmakmg rather than m the legal determination of culpability. They will
function more as a categorization rather than an individualization (Inman &Rudin,
2001), assisting police in the reduction of the overall pool of investigative options
(suspects), to a smaller, more manageable pool.
As scientific participants in this burgeoning development, the forensic community
h~s a responsibility to manage this technological metamorphosis. Although there
will be many members of the community that will see these developments as
nothing other than a beneficial advance in the area of law enforcement and crime
investigation, there will also be a significant section of the community that will
be al~rmed by ~e thou.g~t of genetic determination of ethnicity or appearance
formm~ the bas~s of decisions made by law enforcement personnel. Quite clearly,
the key is education and openness. The forensic community must take care to correct
unrealist~c eXJ::ecta:ions about the potential for this technology. We must clearly
communicate its differences from the established form of DNA evidence, both in
the role it will play and the level of certainty it will provide. We must also ensure
that the model under which such technology is utilised has been well-considered
and supports the most appropriate and beneficial application.
Conclusion
The application of forensic DNA profiling has evolved from a novel specialization
to a wide-reaching pUbli~ tool. Accordingly, discussion and speculation regarding
the ~anner in which DNA evidence is applied has intensified. This expanded role
has increased the burden of responsibility borne by forensic scientists. In addition,
it has widened the range of issues that have relevance to the use of forensic DNA
testing. Many of these issues are neither solely technical in nature nor restricted
to the scientific domain; as such, they are beyond the traditional comfort zone
of scientists. Nonetheless, they must be understood and confronted. Recently,
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scientists to be "multi-skilled," as their role as "educators and communicators was
as important as their role as molecular biologists." This is true. In fact, it could be
ex~ended further to a requirement for forensic experts to be multi-disciplinarily
skilled as many of the previously mentioned complexities have their foundation
in law, criminology, and sociology. If scientists are not prepared to acknowledge
and accept this professional reality and the associated pressures and demands, then
their contribution as expert forensic biologists may be compromised. If we rise to
these challenges with the requisite level of professional integrity, commitment, and
expertise, however, our contribution to maintaining a functional system of criminal
justice will be a significant one.
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Endnotes
I Encompassed in the mentioned review is evidence of a lack of cross-publication
by the forensic community on issues that abut the legal domain.
2 Of additional significance in Ryan was the fact that the DNA evidence was
essentially "stand alone" as the prosecution followed a DNA database match.
) Adventitious matches refer to genuine links provided through the DNA database
in circumstances in which an individual could not have been involved in a given
case but who shares a common DNA profile with the crime scene sample purely
through coincidence.
Simon J. Walsh, BS (Honours), is a lecturer in the Department of Forensic
Biology, Centre for Forensic Science at the University of Technology in Sydney,
Australia. He has over 8 years of experience as a practicing forensic biologist
in Australia and New Zealand. He has supervised and reported over 1,000
criminal cases and presented expert testimony in court on over 50 occasions.
He has worked extensively with the implementation and operation of DNA
database technology including supervisory roles associated with the New
Zealand National DNA Database. Simon joined the Centre for Forensic Science
as a PhD candidate in 2002. In 2003, Simon began his current position as a
lecturer in forensic biology and has teaching and research responsibilities
within the UTS Faculty of Science. For an early career researcher, Simon has
an impressive track record of publications, presentations, and research grant
applications in various areas of forensic biology including population genetics,
forensic intelligence, and non-autosomal DNA profiling. Since 2001, Simon
has published two book chapters and 16 articles and co-edited the forensic
DNA text entitled Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation. In addition, Simon's
research has been presented or published in non-refereed form on over 35
occasions since 1996. Simon has led professional education workshops and
seminars for lawyers, police, and forensic personnel in Australia, New Zealand,
China, the Philippines, and Europe; his ability as a science communicator has
won recognition.
Law Enforcement Exec.••••ve Forum • 2005 • 5(3) 145
